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Signore, signori, “che bisogno c’è di leggi in paradiso?”, this could have been the title of my talk, 
“do we need laws in Paradise?”. Since you all know, the Netherlands, as far as law and 
homosexuality is concerned, has been resembled to Paradise, Heaven or similar places, and 
probably from today or tomorrow it will be slightly less untrue because the Queen is expected to 
sign a royal decree that from the 1st of April you can marry, well we can marry in the Netherlands. 
For foreigners it will be a bit more difficult: at least one of them needs to be Dutch or resident there. 
 Put more generally, the question is: What is the use of an antidiscrimination law in a 
country where things were so advanced that you could get an antidiscrimination law? The legal and 
social situation of lesbians and gays in the Netherlands has been making a lot of progress and is 
indeed among the better in Europe, if not the best in the world. Consequently, antidiscrimination 
legislation could come about quite early. In 1983 (i.e. in the beginning of the twenty year period just 
indicated by Daniel Borrillo) the Dutch Constitution was renewed. Since then, sexual orientation is 
implicitly covered in its antidiscrimination clause (Article 1). In 1992 we got explicit mention of 
sexual orientation in the antidiscrimination provisions of the Penal Code, and in 1994 we got the 
General Equal Treatment Act, covering many grounds including sexual orientation. So in these 
fields, indeed, there has been a lot of progress in the Netherlands.  
 
The Equal Treatment Commission 
A peculiar thing of this General Equal Treatment Act of 1994 is that it established the Equal 
Treatment Commission. (for a discription see: http://www.cgb.nl/commission_frameset.html ) So  
as far as I know, certainly until Sweden appointed Hans Ytterberg as an ombudsman for those sort 
of things, it has been the only body in Europe specifically dealing, among other things, with sexual 
orientation discrimination. It has been sitting since September 1994, and produced  some 700 
opinions, including more case law on sexual orientation discrimination (if you can call its non-
binding opinions "law") than any court in Europe and probably than any court in the world.  
I will be focusing on the work of the Commission here. It is somewhat like a court, but more 
informal; there are no formal rules of evidence, there are no requirements to bring your lawyer and 
no formal ways  how to deal with the procedure.  
Secondly it is more activist than a court would be; so if you are there without a lawyer, the 
Commission will take over a bit of the task of supporting you with making sense of your arguments.  
Its decisions are opinions and they are not legally binding, although in several cases the 
decisions of the Commission have then been followed  by the company or other institution which 
had been found to be discriminating, voluntarily. And in a few cases a court has reaffirmed 
decisions of the Commission. Only in one or two instances, in this field at least, a court has given a 
different opinion. Therefore, it produces non-binding but somewhat effective decisions.  
A fourth characteristic of the Commission is that it has a fairly narrow competence. Apart 
from some small additional tasks, its main task is to give opinions: at the request of bodies who 
think they might be discriminating, but mostly at the request of people who think they themselves 
have been discriminated against. That competence is further narrowed by the exclusion of many 
areas of law and society from the competence of the Commission. For example, it can hardly say 
anything about governmental action, so the whole terrain of family law and immigration law, all of 
tax law and social security law is beyond the competence of the Commission. Basically, it can only 
say something about discrimination in the fields of employment and of the provision of goods and 
services. Also absent from its competence are types of verbal discrimination (incitements, 
derogatory remarks). Such verbal abuse of homosexuals or other minorities can amount to criminal 
offences in the Netherlands, but complaints cannot be heard by the Commission; only the public 
prosecutor can take action.. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has had far more cases of (suspected) sexual orientation 
discrimination to deal with than the courts in the last seven years. There were a few cases related to 
family law, one or two in the immigration field, and four criminal cases about derogatory remarks 
about homosexuality. Three of the latter were lost, on grounds of freedom of religion or freedom of 
speech; only one person was convicted of using insulting language about homosexuals (by calling 
some police officers "filthy homos"). It seems that criminal laws are not so important in this field.  
 
Opinions about sexual orientation, civil status and transsexuality 
Less than 6% of the total output of the Commission is about (claims of) sexual orientation 
discrimination: 40 opinions so far. In addition to that, there have been over 25 cases which are just 
about civil status (another ground covered by the General Equal Treatment Act). There are two 
types of cases in that group; one is discrimination against unmarried partners, and that can be 
indirect anti-homosexual discrimination, as Mark Bell pointed out earlier today. Secondly there is a 
number of cases of indirect discrimination against single people, who felt discriminated against 
because they did not have a partner. In the Netherlands that is sometimes seen as a gay issue, 
because supposedly many gays and lesbians are single. 
What about transsexuals? In the Netherlands, even before the Court of Justice of the EC 
ruled on it, it was found that discrimination against transsexuals falls under gender discrimination, 
rather than under sexual orientation discrimination. So using the ground of sex, complaints about 
anti-transsexual discrimination can be brought before the Commission. That has happened six times 
in seven years. Four of these cases were employment cases, and only one of these was successful; in 
the other three the complaining transsexuals failed to convince the Commission that the 
employment really had been refused or taken away because of transsexuality or gender 
reassignment. The one case [98-12] which was successful, was quite straightforward from an 
evidence point of view because there the employer claimed he had had to transfer the transsexual 
employee to another part of the company against her will because, because her colleagues were 
harassing her. The Commission ruled that, no, he had had do something about the colleagues and 
not move the transsexual involved. This was a successful employment case, which is a rare 
occurrence at the Commission, as we will see later. Of the two other cases [98-107; 98-50] about 
transsexuality, one [98-50] was brought by the Amsterdam Gay Games 1998 organisers, who feared 
that they might be discriminat against transsexuals in their guidelines on how to distinguish 
between male and female competitors. The found these rules to be discriminatory indeed. The final 
case was brought by a person who identified as transgender rather than transsexual, and he claimed 
non-surgical medical treatment as if he were a transsexual. This the hospital refused because he had 
not been diagnosed as being transsexual. The Commission gave as its opionion that this was not 
unlawful discrimination, because the refusal was based not on the ground of transsexuality (sex), 
but on the ground of diagnosis, which ground is not covered by the General Equal Treatment Act. 
Similar medical quirks, being used by the Commission to reject claims of discrimination, have also 
appeared in its case law in some gay cases, as we will see. 
I will now concentrate on the 40 sexual orientation cases. Almost all of these (38) were 
about discrimination against homosexuals, the other two [00-90; 99-13] were about discrimination 
against heterosexuals. That is possible also (and forbidden, too). 
 
Employment cases - getting or losing a job 
Of these 40 cases, 25 had to do with employment. So in that way the Framework directive of the 
European Community seems to be on the right track, in singling out employment as the core area in 
which discrimination needs to be fough. The other 15 cases were about goods and services, mostly 
services.  
Of the 25 dealing with employment 8 were about getting or losing a job, and they almost all 
failed because of lack of evidence. In none of these cases the complainants managed to convince the 
Commission that sexual orientation was the decisive or even a contributory reason in  the decision 
not to hire or to promote or in the decision to dismiss. Several of these cases seem to have been 
about controversial employees who had behaved somewhat unwisely, either at work, or in 
procedures with respect to their employment. When reading their cases, you get the impression that, 
perhaps, if they had been heterosexual and not done certain stupid things, or not been such 
controversial characters, they might still have had the job. But the Commission clearly did not think 
they  had enough evidence to conclude that the person involved had been not reappointed or not  
hired because of their sexual orientation.  
Only the eighth case [99-38] was successful, but that is also a very strange case, as the 
discrimination did not actually take place. Here the case was not brought by someone who felt 
discriminated against, but by a school body which wanted to assert its right to deny employment to 
gay and lesbian applicants. In actual fact, this school body (heading a strict protestant section of a 
larger federation of Christian schools) had been overruled by the superior governing board. So the 
gay man in question did get the job. Still the strict protestant school body that recommended against 
appointing him, put the case before the Commission. This was a good thing, because the whole 
debate of the 1980s and early 1990s leading up to this Equal Treatment Act had been dominated by 
the (hypothetical) case of a stricly religious school wishing to refuse employment to a known 
practising homosexual. The compromise in the Dutch legislative text is almost as unclear as the one 
in the Framework Directive discussed by Mark Bell. It is certainly quite untranslatable. (See for an 
English translation of Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Act: www.cgb.nl .) 
It took more than five years before a case came up to test the compromise. Now the 
Commission seemed so happy at last to have a case [96-39], that they were willing to ignore the fact 
that the school body had not really discriminated, but just recommended against a certain 
appointment. The Commission concluded that the school body had not been clear enough about its 
policy towards the applicant, and that therefore it had been unlawful not to have wanted to employ 
him. It is still the only getting-or-losing-a-job case in which the Commission found a discrimination 
on the ground of sexual orientation.  
 
Cases about employment benefits for partners 
All the other 17 emploment cases were about spousal employment benefits for partners. 
Interestingly, the years 1994-2001 are precisely the seven years that the Dutch debate about law and 
homosexuality was dominated by the issues of registered partnership, and the opening up of 
marriage for same-sex couples. One of the heterosexual cases [99-13] before the Commission was 
about whether or not you could get extra days off if you went to register your partnership (around 
your wedding day you normally can get five extra days off from most employers). The employer in 
question said that only same-sex couples would get days off for their partnership registration, 
because different-sex couples could have those extra days when they would choose to marry, an 
option which was then not yet available to same-sex couples. The Commission disagreed: this was a 
clear case of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and on the basis of civil status, 
because the employer distinguished between marriage and registered partnership and between 
homosexual and heterosexual couples.  
There were also some cases about travel benefits (like in the Lisa Grant case, decedid by the 
Court of Justice of the EC). All these had to do with travelling outside the Netherlands. Dutch Rail 
provides free travel in the Netherlands for your partner if you work there. If you are married you 
also get free travel beyond the Dutch borders (based on an agreement with foreign railway 
companies). Was this a condition of Dutch employment, was it covered by Dutch law? [99-04] The 
Commission found (and this was reaffirmed by the courts) that if certain foreign railway companies 
did not provide free travel for same-sex unmarried partners of Dutch Rail employees, then Dutch 
Rail should pay the full travel costs of these partners in those foreign countries. 
More importantly, 13 of the cases were about pensions, traditionally only paid out to 
married widows (and to married widowers). Most pension funds now also  pay out to unmarried 
surviving partners, but not all. The General Equal Treatment Act, in one of its many exceptions, 
provides that distinctions between married and unmarried people in the field of pensions are not 
(yet) prohibited. For that reason the Commission had to disappoint several complainants about 
discrimination in this field. In one case [99-08] the amount of premium you had to pay was 
dependent on the sex and the life expectancy of your partner, and for men their partner was deemed 
to be a woman (with an accordingly  high life expectancy). In this case the male complainant had a 
male partner, but he still had to pay the extra premium as if his male partner were female. The 
Commission agreed this was discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
In the total of 25 employment cases the Commission only 7 times concluded that there had 
been discrimination.  
 
Cases about medical services 
There have been 14 cases involving the provision of services. (The one case [96-83] about "goods" 
was concerned with tax, so the Commission declared itself not competent to give an opinion about 
it.) 
Seven of these 14 cases were about medical services, putting highly controversial questions 
before the Commission: Can homosexual men be refused to donate blood, or sperm? Can 
heterosexuals be refused to get a free vaccine against hepatitis B? Can a compensation scheme for 
HIV infected people be limited to people who got it through blood products for haemophiliacs, thus 
excluding compensation for people who probably got the virus through sexual contact? Can in vitro 
fertilisation treatment (IVF) be refused to lesbian women? 
With the exception of the IVF case, all these medical cases were thrown out for the same 
reason as I mentioned earlier with respect to the case of the transgenderist. The Commission ruled 
that the  distinction made did not amount to unlawful direct discrimination, because the real reason 
for excluding or including a certain group had been a medical one. The Commission still considered 
the distinction made as possible indirect discrimination, but ruled that reasons of health justified it.  
The seventh medical case [2000-04] was started by the Commission itself, using its power to 
to investigate a certain field of society. The investigating dealt with the eight hospitals in the 
Netherlands that provide in vitro fertilisation treatment. It appeared that some of these hospitals 
refused the treatment to unmarried women, to single women and or to women with female partners. 
In its opinion the Commission did not use the medical exception they had created in the other cases, 
probably because the exceptions were not so much based on reasons of health, but on morals 
(although some hospitals clearly thought it healthier for a child if it also had a "father" present in the 
house). The Commission ruled that it is always unlawful in this field to discriminate against women 
whose partner is female, that it is always unlawful to discriminate against women who are not 
married to their partner, and that depending on the actual reasons use it may also be against the law 
to discriminate against single women. This was one of the most controversial opinions of the 
Commission so far. 
 
Cases about other services 
The seven cases involving non-medical services all led the Commission to a finding of unlawful 
discrimination. The most famous case [97-135] was about education. A Catholic Theological 
College gave credits to students for some voluntary work: they could form and participate in theme 
groups. After a while two homosexual theme groups were formed, called San Sebastian and 
Sappho. The College then decided that students would not get credit for taking part in either of 
those two groups. The students took the case to the Commission. The Commission ruled that this 
was clearly direct discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. There may be a certain (vaguely 
worded) exception in the General Equal Treatment Act for religious ethos organizations, but that 
only applies to them in their capacity of employers. In their capacity of service providers their 
activities were not excluded from the full impact of the law. Another famous case [97-29] was that 
of a dance school refusing same-sex dancing by their students. The Commission ruled that this was 
direct discrimination on the basis of sex.  
 
Conclusion 
The overall picture is that many fields have been exempted from the work of the Commission by 
the text of the General Equal Treatment Act itself. On top of that, a medical exception has been 
created by the Commission. Complaints in the field of employment, especially with respect to 
getting or losing a job, are only rarely successful. The same applies to the field of medical of 
services. In the field of some spousal employment benefits there have been certain successes. In the 
field of non-medical services including education, complainants have been very succesful before 
the Commission. 
So what does this mean? It certainly shows that even in the Netherlands, even in a country 
as advanced, as liberal and as gay friendly as the Netherlands, there are still cases which can and 
should be seen as anti-homosexual discrimination. So it is not quite Paradise, yet. And for some 
categories of those cases, especially like the small things like the dance school and the curious 
elements in pension schemes, the Commission can be quite useful in spelling this out, so that the 
institutions which have discriminated may be led to change its policy or its rules. In the more 
complicated things, like most employment issues are, the Commission is less successful, and 
perhaps here the Dutch Commission compares quite badly to the Swedish Ombudsman, which 
seems to have a wider range of competences, especially in advising the courts and advising the 
government. I would hope that the Dutch Commission and all those other 13 or 14 Commissions or 
Ombudsmen which ideally should spring from the Framework Directive throughout the European 
Union, would be not just like a sort of quasi court, but also a bit like a quasi public prosecutor, and 
like an advisory body. To deal with situations which are more complex than just tiny, 
straightforward examples of discrimination,  you really need to look at the whole situation rather 
than just the discrimination aspect, but you need the special insight into the discrimination aspect to 
make that clear in the whole context. 
The types of cases which have been brought before the Commission, seem to reflect what 
can be expected in a country where the structure of law and the culture of society are largely gay 
friendly (if not quite paradise, yet).  
 
• Firstly, in such a country you will still encounter subcultural discriminations, mostly in 
religious hospitals and schools, and also in the field of verbal discrimination.  
• Much more important than the subcultural forms of discrimination which still pop up from 
time to time (in certain pockets of resistance against the new gay-friendly culture), are what 
you could call suprastructural discriminations. There used to be a structure of 
heterosexually inspired legislation, and on top of that various things have been built (like 
pension schemes) that will still be around in the era after the structure itself has changed. 
And I think the dance schools are examples of the same phenomenon: there students are 
required to dance heterosexually because in former days you could only marry someone of 
the opposite sex.  
• A third category, if you can bear with my academic tendency to categorise everything just a 
little longer, may be that of physical discriminations. As in the case of racial 
discrimination, the closer to the body the service or the employment is, the more likely some 
discrimination issues will arise. The controversial cases about blood donation, vaccination 
and certainly about in vitro fertilization, all have to do with sex and/or reproduction and 
these two things tend to be slightly different in gay and lesbian circles than in heterosexual 
circles, so there really is a debate to what degree these bodily differences should be reflected 
in the treatment of individuals.  
• A fourth category is that of foreign discriminations. People in the Netherlands can be 
affected by discriminations taking place elsewhere, like the foreign rail travel example 
showed.  
• And fifthly, there may be a category of subliminal discriminations. In some situations 
which have gone wrong, where people started to shout and fight and behave less wisely, and 
where no one can really reconstruct what has happened, there may well have been some 
discrimination, but it will be difficult to get sufficient evidence that one party has treated 
someone else differently in the awkward situation then he or she would have treated a 
person pereceived as heterosexual. 
 
I think that all cases that have come before the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, fall into one of 
these five categories of discrimination, and that they are typical for countries like the Netherlands. 
Perhaps this offers some guidance for some of the seven countries in the European Union which 
now already have legislation against sexual orientation discrimination. Of course there are also 
countries in the European Union which on their own were not ready for antidiscrimination 
legislation, and now they suddenly have to enact antidiscrimination legislation. There may well be 
much bigger problems of sexual orientation discrimination in these countries. And perhaps some of 
these problems can not be tackled by an informal, non-binding, quasi-judicial commission like the 
Dutch example. Nevertheless I would recommend that even those countries should have both 
Courts and a Commission competent to deal with anti-homosexual discrimination, plus some firm 
bridges between them.  
 
 
